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 1 
Improving the FDA Approval Process 
 




Abstract.  The FDA employs an average-patient standard when reviewing drugs: it 
approves a drug only if is safe and effective for the average patient in a clinical trial.  It is 
common, however, for patients to respond differently to a drug.  Therefore, the average-patient 
standard can reject a drug that benefits certain patient subgroups (false negative) and even 
approval a drug that harms other patient subgroups (false positives).  These errors increase the 
cost of drug development – and thus health care – by wasting research on unproductive or 
unapproved drugs.  The reason why the FDA sticks with an average patient standard is concern 
about opportunism by drug companies.  With enough data dredging, a drug company can always 
find some subgroup of patients that appears to benefit from its drug, even if it truly does not.   
In this paper we offer alternatives to the average patient standard that reduce the risk of 
false negative without increasing false positives from drug company opportunism.  These 
proposals combine changes to institutional design – evaluation of trial data by an independent 
auditor – with statistical tools to reinforce the new institutional design – specifically, to ensure 
the auditor is truly independent of drug companies. We illustrate our proposals by applying them 
to the results of a recent clinical trial of a cancer drug (motexafin gadolinium).  Our analysis 
suggests that the FDA may have made a mistake in rejecting that drug. 
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Introduction 
Only one out of every five drugs that begin clinical trials emerges successfully from that 
testing.
2
  This high failure rate explains a substantial portion of the exploding costs of health care 
in America.  Although it costs roughly $300 million to conduct a full battery of clinical trials on 
a drug, these costs can only be billed to drugs that are successful enough to be approved by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Dividing the cost of conducting trials by the number 
of successful drugs inflates the cost of clinical testing to $800 million per approved drug.
3
  In this 
manner, the trial failure rate magnifies the already growing cost of conducting clinical trials.
4
  As 
a result, the cost of prescription drugs has grown twice as fast as the cost of the other two major 
components of health care costs, hospital stays and physician care, helping push the overall cost 
of healthcare to 16% of GDP.
5
 
There are two reasons for why so many drugs might fail clinical trials.  First, most drugs 
might not work.   Perhaps scientists have plucked the low-hanging pharmacological fruit and 
drug companies now face diminishing returns on their research investments.   Second, clinical 
trials might fail to identify all the drugs that work.  If the first explanation is correct, there is little 
that can be done to reduce the cost of prescription drugs.  However, the first explanation depends 
on the second explanation being incorrect.  If trials cannot identify all safe and effective drugs, 
then one cannot know if we have run out of such drugs.  This paper suggests that the high failure 
rate of drugs is partly due to the failure of trials to identify good drugs and proposes a regulatory 
solution to the problem. 
The problem with clinical trials is not so much how they are designed, but rather how the 
information they produce is evaluated.  The FDA uses an “average patient standard” to 
determine whether a drug is safe and effective.  That is, the FDA compares how the average trial 
participant on a drug compares to the average trial participant on placebo.  If the former does 
better than the latter, then the drug is approved.  Otherwise not.  If a drug works in some patients 
                                                 
2
 More precisely, out of every five drugs for which an Investigational New Drug (IND) application is filed with the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to begin clinical testing, only one results in a New Drug Application 
(NDA) for marketing approval from the FDA.  Christopher P. Adams and Van V. Brantner, Estimating The Cost Of 
New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 Health Aff. 420, 422 (Exhibit 1) (2006). 
3
 Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, Henry G. Grabowski, The price of innovation: new estimates of drug 
development costs, 22 J. Health Econ. 151, 166 (2003).  The reason one cannot simply divide the $200 million 
estimate by the probability of success during clinical testing (0.2 = 1/5) is that not all drugs complete a full battery of 
clinical tests.   
4
 Id. at 167. 
5
 The cost of prescription drugs grew, on average, by 12% from 1996-2006.  By contrast, hospital and physician 
costs grew by roughly 6% per year during that period.  Kaiser Family Foundation, Prescription Drug Trends 1 
(2008), available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057_07.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
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but not others, however, the average patient standard may reject drugs that are effective for some 
patients.  These drugs may be effective for a subset of trial participants, just not the average 
participant.  In short, the average patient standard suffers from false negatives. 
It is common for drugs to have different effects in different patients, a phenomenon 
statistician call “heterogeneity in treatment effects”.  For example, Anthrotec (Pfizer) is an 
effective treatment for osteoarthritis for patients who develop ulcers when certain common pain 
medications.
6
  But a key ingredient in Anthrotec – misoprostol – is documented to induce labor 
and used for medical elective abortion.
7
  Therefore, while Anthrotec is generally effective for 
pain relief, it is contraindicated
8
 for pregnant women because of its abortifacient effects.  
Another example is isoniazid, a widely used chemotherapy drug used to treat patients with 
tuberculosis.  Different patients metabolize the drug at different rates and a patient’s rate of 
metabolization of the drug can be discovered through genetic testing.  It has been demonstrated 
that the drug is effective in patients who metabolize the drug at a slow rate but not among 
patients who metabolize it at a fast rate.
9
 
The FDA is aware of the risk of false negatives under the average patient standard.  The 
reason they stick with the standard is that they think the alternative is to allow drug companies to 
mine data from clinical trials to find subgroups of participants who show benefit from the drug.  
This alternative – which is called post hoc subgroup analysis10 – just replaces the risk of false 
negatives with false positives.  The more subgroups a drug company examines, the more likely 
they are to find one that shows improvement on their drug, whether or not their drug actually 
works.  Statisticians call this the risk of spurious correlation from “multiple testing”.  Drug 
companies have a financial incentive to ignore – and even promote – this risk.  They have 
                                                 
6
 Anthrotec is diclofenac sodium plus misoprostol.  Osteoarthritis is pain and inflammation caused by the breakdown 
of cartilage in a patient’s joints.  The pain medications that cause ulcers are non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
(NSAIDs).  The drug is made by Pfizer. 
7
 See Goldberg et al., Misoprostol and Pregnancy, 34(1) New Eng. J. Med. 38 (Jan. 4, 2001). 
8
 Arthrotec product insert at 1, available at FDA, Label and Approval History – Arthrotec, Labeling revision, Aug. 
24, 2007, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2007/020607s010lbl.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2008). 
9
 Gordon A. Ellard and Patricia T. Gammon, Pharmacokinetics of isoniazid metabolism in man, 4 J. Pharmokinetics 
& Pharmacodynamics 83, 83-84 (1976). 
10
 To be precise, subgroup analysis is statistical evaluation of the effect of a drug on one or more subgroups of the 
subjects in a clinical trial.  Post hoc subgroup analysis, in particular, is the estimation of treatment effects in 
subgroups that were not specified prior to the start of the trial.  Instead the statistical analysis is performed on 
subgroups identified from the data after the trial had begun or was completed.   
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invested millions in lab research and development; they can only recoup this if their drug is 
approved.
11
   
It seems patients are stuck between a rock and a hard place: too many false negatives 
with the FDA’s average patient standard or too many false positives with drug company data 
mining.  This paper offers a third option – actually, a series of proposals – that reduces false 
negatives without increasing false positives.  This will increase the rate of approval only for 
effective drugs, and reduce the waste of research expenditures.   
The problem we identify with clinical trial is not their design but the way the FDA and 
drug companies interpret the data from trials.  Our first proposal, however, is to change in the 
design of trials to reduce errors from the average patient standard.  To understand the change, 
some additional background on FDA policy is required.  While the FDA rules out post hoc 
subgroup analysis due to the risk of false positives, it does allow companies to identify 
subgroups of patients they plan to study before they conduct a trial.  That is, companies are 
permitted to select subgroups of patients from the overall population to enroll, but they may not 
select subgroups of patients from those already enrolled in a trial to demonstrate that a drug 
works.  The reason is that the latter approach lets drug companies “peek” at the answers before 
giving the test.  But the FDA’s compromise does not really address the false negative risk with 
the average patient standard.  Drug companies may not know which subgroups of patients will 
benefit from a drug before testing the drug on a broad population of patients.   
Therefore, our first proposal is to identify treatment-sensitive subgroups using an 
“adaptive group sequential design” trial.  In standard trials, patients are typically assigned to the 
treatment or control group according to a pre-set randomization scheme and remain in their 
assigned groups.  In an adaptive design, new patients can be randomized to treatment or control 
based on the performance of patients previously enrolled in the trial.  If a certain subgroup of 
participants seem to be doing better than others based on early returns, the drug company could 
selectively enroll more patients from that subgroup in the general population as the trial 
progresses.  The goal is to identify treatment-sensitive subgroups based on data from early 
enrollees in order to power up analysis of those subgroups among later enrollees.   
Our second proposal – actually a pair of proposals – focuses on fixing post hoc subgroup 
analysis to reduce data mining by drug companies.  These proposals combine institutional design 
– evaluation of trial data by an independent auditor – with statistical tools to reinforce the 
institutional design – specifically, to ensure the auditor is truly independent.   
                                                 
11
 If the FDA knew the number of subgroups the sponsor sampled in search of a positive response the FDA could 
limit the risk of spurious correlation by employing statistical corrections for multiple testing, such as raising the p-
value required to demonstrate statistical significance.   Unfortunately, the FDA will rarely be able to verify this 
number.  (We will discuss corrections for multiple testing at greater length in the text accompanying note 43.) 
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Specifically, our proposal would permit post hoc subgroup analysis so long as it were 
performed by an independent auditor rather than the drug company.  We have learned from the 
Enron and MCI Worldcom scandals, however, that independent auditors are not truly 
independent.
12
  They may be indirectly compromised by career concerns.  They may seek to 
provide optimistic assessments of firms in the hope that they will subsequently be employed by 
those firms for other auditor work.  The same would be true of an outside statistician auditing 
data from a company’s clinical trial.  To address this concern, our second proposal suggests 
statistical algorithms that prevent the independent auditor from identifying subgroups in a 
manner that would financially benefit drug companies but would not help patients.  These 
algorithms may be thought of as veil of ignorance rules
13
 because they blind the auditor to 
information that is required for the auditor to help the drug company.   
Our most promising algorithm is what we call “split-sample analysis.”  This algorithm 
would give the auditor access only to a random subsample of the trial data as selected by the 
FDA.  The consultant would be asked to identify subgroups with post hoc subgroup analysis on 
this “exploratory” sample.  The drug company would then be permitted to seek drug approval for 
a subgroup identified by the auditor under two conditions.  First, it can only obtain approval for a 
subgroup if the drug was significantly effective and safe for that subgroup in the remainder of the 
trial sample, which we call the “confirmatory” sample.  Second, statistical significance14 will be 
judged according to a higher standard to account for the risk of spurious correlation due to 
multiple testing bias.  The larger the number of subgroups identified by the auditor, the stricter 
the standard of statistical significance the company would have to meet.
15
 
This algorithm protects against false positives in two ways.  Because the auditor does not 
have access to confirmatory sample, it cannot help the drug company out by choosing subgroups 
that respond positively only in the confirmatory sample.  Nor can the consultant help the drug 
company simply by identifying a large number of subgroups based on the exploratory sample 
because the sponsor pays a multiple-testing penalty in the confirmatory subsample for each 
additional subgroup that the auditor identifies.   
                                                 
12
 See Joel S. Demski, Corporate Conflicts of Interest, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 51, 57 (2003). 
13
 For a discussion of this class of rules, see Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 
Yale L. J. 399 (2001). 
14
 Statistical significance is conventionally defined as having a p-value less than or equal to 0.05.  The p-value of a 
statistical estimate is one minus the probability that the estimate is different from zero, which signifies no treatment 
effect.  In other words, if p < 0.05, then it can be said that we are more than 95% sure that the estimated treatment 
effect is different than zero.   
15
 Our proposal would let the drug company choose the number of subgroups the auditor should identify to ensure 
the auditor did not “tank” the drug company by simply identifying too many subgroups. 
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To illustrate the potential benefit of increased flexibility in the drug approval process and 
to demonstrate how our statistical algorithms could address the data manipulation problem, we 
conduct a case study of motexafin gadolinium (MGd), a drug for lung cancer patients whose 
tumors have spread to their brain and are threatening to induce dementia. In a key clinical trial, 
the drug’s maker Pharmacyclics was unable to show that the average participant experienced a 
statistically significant benefit from the drug.
16
  This failure may have been driven, however, by 
poor results among patients who had already taken chemotherapy for their cancer.  Among the 
patients who were newly diagnosed and had not yet received any chemotherapy,
17
 the drug 
appeared to significantly delay the onset of dementia.  Despite this possibility, the FDA rejected 
the drug.
18
  Mimicking the role of outside auditors, we apply our proposed statistical algorithms 
to correct for bias due to any opportunistic behavior by the drug company.  We find that one of 
our algorithms would surely have validated the company’s claims and the other – split-sample 
analysis – would have validated them with probability 0.11.   That is, there is at least a one-in-ten 
chance that a truly independent audit would have led to the approval of MGd. 
Before we turn to the meat of the paper, we should clarify three things about our 
proposals.  First, while we advocate a change in how the FDA evaluates data from clinical trials, 
we do not advocate lowering the FDA’s standard for approving drugs.  Our proposals would all 
continue to require that a drug be shown safe and effective with 95% confidence in order to be 
approved.    
Second, our proposals can be used to eliminate false positives as well as false negatives.  
Although a drug may not have side effects for the average patient, it may have prohibitive side 
effects for a subgroup of patients.  Yet such a drug might be approved under the FDA’s average 
patient standard.  Our proposals for identifying subgroups of patients who benefit from a drug 
can equally be used to identify subgroups of patients who would be harmed by a drug.  While 
there may be little reason to worry that a drug company will exaggerate the harm from a drug, 
some have expressed concern that the FDA is overly risk averse or antagonistic to drug 
companies and might exaggerate the harm from a drug.
19
  Our proposals can be used to ensure 
that an outside auditor is truly independent of FDA influence and thus does not spuriously 
identify subgroups harmed by a drug.   
Finally, our proposals – especially the split-sample algorithm – highlight the potential 
that statistical veil of ignorance rules can promote auditor independence.  This is true for whether 
                                                 
16
 See infra text accompanying notes 71 and 73. 
17
 Their tumors tended to be more resilient as they had already survived previous treatment.   
18
 See Jungbauer, supra note 1. 
19
 See, e.g., Henry I. Miller and David R. Henderson, The FDA’s Risky Risk-Aversion, Policy Review 5 (Oct. & Nov. 
2007). 
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the target of an audit is a clinical trial, a tax filing, or a report to shareholders.  In short, our 
algorithms may have utility in other areas of where law enforcement is concerned about 
dishonest reporting by private companies. 
The remainder of the paper has the following structure.  Section 1 explains how the FDA 
currently handles heterogeneous treatment response.  Section 2 discusses the problem of spurious 
correlation and opportunism associated with post hoc subgroup analysis.  Section 3 presents our 
proposals for controlling opportunism by drug companies.  Section 4 examines data from the 
MGd trial to illustrate the new statistical algorithms we propose.  Finally, the conclusion 
discusses, inter alia, how our proposals might be used to root out harmful drugs.  
1. FDA policy on heterogeneity in treatment response 
The Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act requires that a company seeking marketing approval 
for a new drug – also called the drug sponsor – demonstrate to the FDA that the drug is safe and 
effective.
20
  This demonstration typically requires three phases of clinical testing.  In Phase I, the 
sponsor conducts a small clinical study, usually on health individuals, to demonstrate that a 
clinically useful dose is not toxic for patients.  In Phase II, the sponsor conducts a medium-sized 
study on sick patients to provide evidence that the drug has some clinical benefit in humans and 
warrants further clinical testing.  In Phase III, the sponsor conducts two large-scale, controlled 
clinical trials, again in sick patients, to demonstrate that the drug is both effective and has 
relatively tolerable side effects.
21
   
Although regulations do not spell out exactly the evidentiary standard to which the FDA 
holds a new drug, the FDA has issued a guidance that emphasizes a drug should evaluated based 
on all the patients that enroll in a trial
22
 and that requires the rate of false positive findings be set 
to 5 percent.
23
  The implication – borne out by practice – is that the FDA judges the efficacy of a 
drug by the difference between average outcomes in the treatment and control arms of a trial. 
                                                 
20
 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
21
 Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 527 n. 2 (2d ed. 1991).  For 
a more detailed analysis of the two-trial requirement, see Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the “Gold 
Standard” for New Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 54 
Food & Drug L. J. 127, 129-130 (1999) (explaining that a second trial is due to the scientific requirement of 
replication, that the requirement is occasionally waived, and that biologics are less likely to face this requirement).  
22
 This is called the intent-to-treat population.  It includes even the subjects that drop out.  See Food and Drug 
Agency, International Conference on Harmonisation; Guidance on Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials, 
Availability, 63(179) Fed. Reg. 49583, 49593 (Sept. 16, 1998) (henceforth “Statistical Guidance” (§5.2.1 Full 
Analysis Set).  The alternative is to evaluate the drug on the per-protocol population.  In this case the drug is 
evaluated only among subjects who enroll, do not drop out, and follow all trial procedures.  
23
 Id. at 49291 (§3.5 Sample Size). 
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The FDA understands that there is heterogeneity of treatment effects across patient 
subgroups.
24
  But it only accommodates this heterogeneity in a limited way.  To begin with, it 
encourages sponsors to specify prior to conducting a trial – or in statistic parlance, specify a 
priori – the subgroups they plan to analyze.25  When this is done, sponsors must account for the 
risk of spurious correlation due to multiple testing bias when setting their initial sample size and 
when analyzing data from a trial.
26
  The FDA guidance does not explicitly state that significant 
treatment effects among  a priori specified subgroups can be the basis for drug approval, but it 
does not rule it out.   
In many cases, however, the sponsor may not have enough information prior to trials to 
identify subgroups that may be especially sensitive to treatment.  Even if it did, the FDA would 
require the sponsor to increase sample size so that its study gathers sufficient statistical 
information – or “power” – to accurately estimate treatment effects in those subgroups.27  This 
additional cost may outstrip the financial resources available to many sponsors.   
The FDA acknowledges that it will not always be possible to identify subgroups a priori 
and that exploratory analysis of trial data may be required to identify subgroups.
28
  The FDA’s 
                                                 
24
 Id. at 49589 (§3.2 Multicenter Trials). 
25
 Id. at 49595 (§5.7 Subgroups, Interactions, and Covariates). 
26
 Id. at 49587 (§2.2.5 Multiple Primary Variables).  The agency recognizes that the corrections are less severe 
where subgroups overlap and therefore produce correlated test statistics.  If two subgroups are mutually exclusive, 
the outcomes across groups are statistically independent.  The appropriate adjustment for multiple testing bias is the 
Bonferroni adjustment, which is described in Section 2.  If the two subgroups overlap in part, the outcomes of the 
groups will be positively correlated.  In that case the failure of a test on one group will contribute to the failure of a 
test for the overlapping second group.  This reduces the risk of spurious results from statistical tests on the second 
group.  Therefore, something weaker than the Bonferroni adjustment is required to correct for multiple testing bias. 
27
 The basic formula for how large the sample in each subgroup must be to ascertain a treatment effect is   
   (       )
 
   .  In this formula,   is how sensitive the researcher wants the estimate to be.  In other words, 
the formula gives the sample size required to identify treatment effects that are at least as large as  .  The formula 
also depends on  , the variance of the treatment effect from the drug.  The larger the variance, the more the noise in 
the data and thus the larger the sample size required to identify a treatment effect as small as  .  Usually the 
researcher estimates   from previous studies of the drug or the disease.  The crucial statistical parameters are     , 
which determines defines the confidence level of the analysis, and   , which determines the power of the analysis.  
The higher is the confidence level of the analysis, the lower is the chance of a false positive.  A confidence level of 
95% (i.e.,       ) means that the probability that a significant result is false is just 5%.  The critical value for this 
level of confidence in a two-sided test with a normal distribution is          .  The higher is the power of an 
analysis, the lower is the chance of a false negative.  A power level of 80% (     ) means that the probability that 
a drug with a positive treatment effect is mistakenly reported as having an insignificant treatment effect is 20%.  The 
critical value for this level of power is            As is apparent from the formula, greater higher confidence 
levels and power require larger sample size. 
28
 Id. at 49595 (§5.7). 
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approach to subsequent so-called post hoc subgroup analysis
29
 depends on the average treatment 
effect in the full trial population and whether the outcome at issue concerns efficacy or safety.   
If the sponsor cannot demonstrate that the average treatment effect is sufficient that the 
drug will be approved for the full trial population, post hoc subgroup analysis by itself cannot be 
used to obtain approval for a subgroup.
30
  The FDA has not approved a single drug solely on the 
basis of post hoc subgroup analysis.
31
  The FDA does permit a sponsor to use post hoc subgroup 
analysis identify a subgroup and then to conduct a subsequent trial on that subgroup to confirm 
the findings of the subgroup analysis.  But another trial can be very costly.
32
  And there is no 
indication that the FDA allows sponsors to combine or “pool” the data from the subgroup in the 
initial trial with data on the subgroup from the subsequent confirmatory trial to establish a 
significant positive result for the subgroup across the two trials.
33
 Such a combination would 
mitigate the sample size requirement – and hence costs – for the confirmatory trial. 
Even if the sponsor is able to demonstrate that its drug is on average safe and effective 
for the full trial population in the initial trial, the FDA may require the sponsor to demonstrate 
the drug is effective and safe for subgroups defined by the agency in order to validate the results 
for the full trial population.  FDA guidelines identify subgroups defined by centers in multicenter 
trials as one such check on the consistency of the trial’s main results,34 but clinically and 
biologically defined subgroups have also been suggested.
35
  If certain subgroups do not show 
efficacy or show side effects, the FDA may require that the drug label state it is indicated only 
for the subpopulations where it has been demonstrated both effective and safe.  For example, 
following the Val-HeFT trial of 160 mg valsartan for patients with heart failure, the FDA only 
approved the drug for patients who are intolerant to ACE inhibitors.  The reason was that in the 
full trial population the drug was superior to placebo only with respect to only one (combined 
mortality and morbidity) of the two outcomes studied.
36
  (The other outcome was mortality 
                                                 
29
 See note 10 for a precise definition of post hoc subgroup analysis. 
30
 Id. at 49595 (§5.7).  See also John Powers et al., FDA Evaluation of Antimicrobials: Subgroup Analysis, Letter to 
Editor, 126(6) Chest 2298 (June 2005). 
31
 Aldo P. Maggioni, et al., FDA and CPMP Rulings on Subgroup Analyses, 107 Cardiology 97, 99 (2007). 
32
 It is difficult to estimate from published data the cost of individual trials but it is possible to estimate the cost of 
different phases of clinical testing.  The out-of-pocket plus opportunity costs of phase I are $45.7 million, phase II 
are $65.1 million, and phase III are $205.5 million.  See DiMasi, et al., supra note 3, at 162 (table 1) and 165 (table 
3).  If phase III involves just two trials, then the cost of per phase III trial is over $100 million.   
33
 We examine this approach in infra note 49. 
34
 FDA, Statistical Guidance, supra note 22, at 49589 (§3.2) 
35
 See Powers et al., supra note 30, at 2298. 
36
 The primary endpoint of a trial is the outcome on which the treatment is judged. 
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alone.)  However, the drug was superior on both outcomes in the non-ACE subgroup.
37
  The 
FDA may also require the sponsor for a drug with an uneven or uncertain safety profile to 
conduct Phase IV post-approval trials.  If the Phase IV trials reveal dangerous side effects, FDA 
has the ability to alter a drug’s labeling to reflect those risks or to yank a drug from the market. 
In short, the FDA takes a conservative and asymmetric approach with respect to subgroup 
analysis.
38
  If subgroups are identified prior to trial, they may positively influence approval so 
long as the sponsor powers the study to address multiple testing concerns.  If subgroups cannot 
be identified prior to trial, post hoc subgroup analysis can only be used to negatively influence 
approval or to justify new, costly trials.
39
   
It is worth noting that the FDA’s approach – judging drugs largely on the basis of average 
treatment effects – implicitly assumes that doctors are very bad at matching the right patient 
subgroups to drugs.
40
  To understand why, observe that the average treatment effect of a drug    
(relative to control   ) is equal to its positive treatment effect among patient subgroups that 
benefit from the drug (i.e.,      ) plus its negative treatment effects among those who do not 
(i.e.,      ):  
 (     )    (     |     )  (   ) (     |     ) 
where     (     ) is the fraction of people who benefit from the drug.  However, the drug 
only harms patients among whom it is contraindicated if doctors give those patients the drug.  
The problem is that the FDA’s average-effects rule mathematically assumes this occurs, i.e., that 
doctors give the drug to every patient even if it harms those patients.  If the FDA had more faith 
in doctors, it would instead estimate the value of a drug solely by its positive effects among the 
subgroup that benefits from the drug.
41
  The FDA would not have to worry about harming 
patients for whom the drug is inappropriate because doctors would not give these patients the 
drug. 
                                                 
37
 See Maggioni et al., supra note 31, at 99. 
38
 The European Union’s Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) has a similar policy.  Id. at 97. 
39
 See Richard Wunderink et al., FDA Evaluation of Antimicrobials: Subgroup Analysis, Letter to Editor, 126(6) 
Chest 2300 (June 2005) (highlighting asymmetric implications of post hoc subgroup analysis for FDA approval). 
40
 See Anup Malani and Feifang Hu, The option value of new therapeutics 14, unpublished manuscript (2004).  The 
bad matching may be because there is no way to determine which patients benefit and which do not, because doctors 
cannot or do not distinguish between patients that benefit and those that do not, or because doctors give the drug to 
patients that they know will not benefit from it. 
41
 This value is larger than the average effect of the drug in clinical trials.  Because  (     |     )   , 
  (     |     )    (     |     )  (   ) (     |     ). 
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2. Cost and benefits from post hoc subgroup analysis  
The FDA’s conservative position on post hoc subgroup analysis is based on concerns that 
multiple testing creates a risk of spurious correlation, which can result in false positive drug 
approvals.
42
  To illustrate, consider the following Statistics 101-type hypothetical.  Suppose there 
is a population that can be divided into 10 mutually exclusive subgroups.  For example, if the 
trial population ranges in age uniformly from 20 to 70, we can divide the group into 10 equally 
sized five-year age bins: 20-24, 25-39, etc.  Suppose also that there is a drug which has no effect 
on either the full population or on any subgroup, though there is some random variation in 
observed outcomes either due to the drug or natural progression.  For example, we might assume 
that the treatment effect for each subgroup is a normally distributed random variable with mean 
equal to zero and variance equal to one.  The probability that the drug will be proven effective on 
the full population with a confidence level of 95% is just 5%.   
But if the sponsor seeking approval for our hypothetical drug is permitted to separately 
test the drug against each of the 10 subgroups, the probability that he will be able to demonstrate 
efficacy for at least one subgroup is  0.4 (= 1 – 0.9510).  This obviously raises the risk of false 
positives, that is, the possibility of approving the drug even though it has not been demonstrated 
effective at the 95% confidence level.   
If the FDA knows that the sponsor will test the drug against 10 subgroups, it can 
implement a multiple testing correction or penalty to eliminate spurious results.  For example, if 
the outcomes in the 10 subgroups are known to be uncorrelated, then it can change the threshold 
p-value required for approval from p = 0.05 to p = 0.05 / (number of tests) or 0.005.
43
   This 
correction is known as the Bonferroni adjustment.  It ensures the probability of observing even 
one subgroup with significant treatment effects is back to 5%.  The proper p-value adjustment in 
the cases where outcomes in the subgroups are correlated is different, but this correlation and the 
adjustment may be derived from the data.
44
 
The problem is that the FDA does not know the number of subgroups against which the 
sponsor will test its drug and cannot trust drug companies to honestly report this number.  
Therefore, the FDA cannot in practice impose a proper multiple testing penalty.  This problem 
becomes exponentially more severe the larger the number of possible subgroups. Suppose the 
sponsor can also divide the adult population by gender (male/female) and by ethnicity 
                                                 
42
 See Kulynych, supra note 21, at 141, John A. Lewis, Statistical Issues in the Regulation of Medicine, 14 Stat. in 
Med. 127, 132 (1995). 
43
 We are ignoring the 11
th
 test on the full population to keep the numbers simple and because the full population 
result is positively correlated with each subgroup result. 
44
 Sandrine Dudoit and Mark van der Laan, Multiple testing procedures with applications to genomics (New York: 
Springer, 2008).  See also the discussion in note 26. 
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(white/black/Hispanic/other) and the drug still has no treatment effect for any subgroup.  Now 
the available subgroups has jumped from 10 based solely on age to 80 (= 10 × 2 × 4) based on a 
combination of age, gender and ethnicity.  If the sponsor can cherry-pick a subgroup in which to 
demonstrate efficacy, the probability it will be find able to find at least one with a p-value less 
than 0.05 is 0.98 (= 1 – 0.9580)!  The sponsor has a strong financial incentive to cherry-pick in 
this manner because the alternative may be not to obtain any return on its investment in the drug.  
We call this the problem of opportunistic behavior by sponsors.
45
 
The FDA’s response to this risk is to base its drug approval decision solely on average 
treatment effects for the full trial population.  This bars any approval based on post hoc subgroup 
analysis without further clinical trials.  But this response swings the pendulum of error too far in 
the opposite direction.  Instead of approving some drugs with no treatment effect (false 
positives), the FDA’s conservative policy rejects some drugs with positive treatment effects for 
some subgroups (false negatives) or increases the costs of drugs if the sponsor conducts a follow-
on trial to confirm the results of post hoc subgroup analysis.  To illustrate the problem of false 
negatives, suppose that the drug in our hypothetical actually has positive treatment effects in one 
of the 10 subgroups defined by age.  The probability of approving the drug based on the results 
for the full trial population is virtually zero.
46
 
Before we can suggest a compromise solution, a good question to ask is whether post hoc 
subgroup analysis can ever provide sufficiently reliable information to warrant approval of a 
drug, even ignoring the risks from spurious correlation and opportunistic behavior.  After all, 
when subgroups are not specified before a trial begins, the trial is not powered – i.e., does not 
have sufficient sample size and thus does not generate sufficient statistical information – to 
estimate subgroup effects in a manner that meets the usual standards for confidence (5%) and 
power (20%).
47
  Compounding this problem is that subgroups by definition have smaller sample 
size than the full trial population.   
                                                 
45
 We do not dispute that ex ante drug sponsors have an incentive to produce drugs that actually work.  Productive 
drugs surely generate more revenue than unproductive ones.  The problem is post hoc subgroup analysis we examine 
occurs after a drug sponsor has found that the average patient does not benefit from its drug.  Therefore it is facing a 
loss equal to the cost of its drug development expenses.  The only reason it has to avoid spurious correlation due to 
multiple testing is litigation risk from failure-to-warn products liability suits.  But these suits can be foreclosed by 
appropriate warnings.  Moreover, they do not cover the risk of a drug being less effective than alternative treatment.  
Finally, it is unlikely that the average ineffective drug has expected litigation costs larger than the incurred cost of 
development.   
46
 One would need five or more subgroups that do not benefit to “show” a benefit.  This is roughly equivalent to the 
probability that five or more successes out of ten draws from a binomial distribution with p=0.05.  The formula and 
value are   (   )    ∑ (
 
 
)                            . 
47
 See Salim Yusuf et al., Analysis and Interpretation of Treatment Effects in Subgroups of patients in Randomized 
Clinical Trials, 266 JAMA 93, 94 (1991).   
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We do not think, however, that these concerns render post hoc analysis useless.  There 
are a number of technical reasons why such analysis may yield useful information even without a 
larger sample.  First, sample size calculations are based on estimates of the variance of treatment 
effects in the full trial population.  Because those estimates themselves have sample variation, 
there is a positive probability that they are in fact too high, leaving samples larger than required 
for accurate identification of subgroup effects.  Second, because subgroups are a subset of the 
full trial population, they are correlated with that population.  Thus analysis of the full trial 
population and one subgroup requires something less than a two-fold overestimate of variance to 
be powered to give reliable information.  Third, because subgroups may be more homogenous 
than the full trial population, the subgroup may have smaller variation in treatment effects.  This 
diminished variation means that doubling the number of subgroups does not double the required 
sample size for the trial.  We shall demonstrate this in our analysis of the MGd trial.   
3. Rehabilitating post hoc subgroup analysis 
In this section we discuss two proposals that offer a compromise between (1) false 
positives due to opportunistic behavior and (2) false negatives or the cost of additional trials due 
to the FDA’s cautious approach to subgroup analysis.  Our aim is to extract more reliable 
information on subgroup effects from trial data that can be used to approve drugs for use in 
subgroups with as little additional cost as possible from larger sample size in the initial trial or a 
new trial.   
Our first proposal – the use of adaptive designs – should not come as a surprise.  It has 
been advocated by biostatisticians and regulators as a way to reduce sample size or limit harm to 
trial participants even in the absence of varying treatment effects across patient subgroups.
48
  The 
remainder of this section sketches how adaptive designs help address subgroup effects and 
discuss the sample size costs of those designs.  The second proposal – deferred to the next 
section – requires a modified form of subgroup analysis to be performed by an outside 
consultant.   It would also allow the FDA to approve a drug without the expense of further trials.   
a. What the FDA should continue to do 
Before explaining our reform proposals, we want to highlight two things that the FDA 
gets right in its current policy towards subgroup analysis.
49
  First, the FDA is correct that, if the 
                                                 
48
 See, e.g., Donald A. Berry, Bayesian clinical trials, 5 Nature Reviews - Drug Discovery 27 (2006) (arguing that 
adaptive design can be employed to lower sample size and improve treatment outcomes for enrolled patients); Scott 
Gottlieb, Speech before 2006 Conference on Adaptive Trial Design, Washington, DC (July 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2006/trialdesign0710.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009) (observing that adaptive 
designs can ends trials of drugs with severe side effects more quickly). 
49
 However, we are concerned that the FDA makes other mistakes when aggregating information across clinical 
trials.  Although the FDA may correctly apply multiple-testing corrections within trials, there is reason to be 
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identity of sensitive subgroups is known prior to a trial, the sponsor should set the sample size 
for a trial so that the trial is able to estimate significant results for these subgroups.
50
  For reasons 
mentioned earlier (correlation between subgroup outcomes and full trial population outcomes 
and greater homogeneity within subgroups), the additional sample size required to analyze two 
subgroups is not double that required to analyze the single full trial population.  Therefore, the 
costs of powering a trial to test a priori specified subgroups is less than proportional to the 
number of groups, as is often assumed. 
Second, the FDA is also correct to use multiple-testing adjustments to avoid spurious 
results from analysis of a priori specified subgroups.  The FDA is aware that Bonferroni 
adjustments may be too conservative because of the assumption that subgroups are independent.   
Because some patients fall in multiple subgroups or share biological features of members in 
other subgroups, treatment results in one subgroup may be related to effects in another subgroup.  
Thus, separate tests on two subgroups are less than two bites at the apple.  Applying a Bonferroni 
adjustment in this case would result in an overcorrection for the risk of spurious correlation. 
b. Adaptive trials proposal 
i. Background on adaptive trials 
                                                                                                                                                             
concerned that the FDA does not apply those corrections correctly across trials.  Suppose a sponsor conducts an 
initial trial that does not show intent-to-treat effects but post hoc analysis reveals possible subgroup effects, and the 
sponsor conducts a second trial solely to confirm the subgroup effects.  One the one hand, the second trial should be 
able to credit subgroup members in the first trial towards sample size requirements in the second trial.  On the other 
hand, a significant result in the second trial may be spurious because it is itself a second test.  Indeed, if one 
conducted 100 trials on a given subgroup, 5% would show significant effects for that subgroup even if its true effect 
is zero.  This risk of multiple testing across trials is partly addressed by the fact that a company must inform the 
FDA of every trial it conducts to support an IND and by the fact that many journals will not publish an article 
reporting the results of a trial that has not been reported to a trial registry such as clinicaltrials.gov.  See 21 C.F.R. § 
312.23 (2008); Catherine De Angelis, et al., Clinical trial registration: a statement from the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 141 Ann. Intern. Med. 477 (2004).  We cannot, however, find evidence from 
stated FDA policy or practice that the FDA understands and properly addresses these concerns.  That said, it is likely 
the case that the extreme cost of Phase III trials limits the frequency of opportunistic behavior across multiple trials. 
50
 An even better approach may be to specify subgroups not by patient characteristics at baseline, but by an 
algorithm that has as inputs not just those characteristics but also outcomes recorded as the trial progresses.  Suppose 
the sponsor suspects that treatment effects may depend on one of 10 genetic markers, but is not sure which one.  
Instead of picking one of the those markers before the trial begins, the sponsor could, for example, specify that after 
  fraction of subjects have enrolled, it will correlate those markers with outcomes and pick as a subgroup those 
subjects possessing the marker with the highest correlation with outcomes.  So long as   is specified before the 
trial begins, it is theoretically possible – though perhaps not easy – to derive a sample size to ensure this trial is 
properly powered.  There may not be any penalty for multiple testing so that the critical p-value may remain 0.05.  
Nor is there a risk of opportunistic behavior by the sponsor since the FDA can implement the algorithm itself and 
verify the subgroup the sponsor has identified as correct.   
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The prototypical clinical trial is a fixed design trial. In this design, patients are 
randomized between a treatment group and a control group.  The total number of patients 
enrolled in the trial – the sample size – and the fraction of patients assigned to treatment group 
are fixed before the trial begins and remain the same until it ends.  The sample size required to 
run such a trial depends on the minimal size   of clinically-relevant treatment effects the sponsor 
wants to be able to identify and the variance    of the treatment effect from the drug.51   
The problem is that the sponsor may not know these parameters.  Indeed, one of the 
purposes of the trial is to estimate these parameters.  One solution is to use results from prior 
studies of the sponsor’s drug or of related drugs.  When such studies are not available or are 
unreliable, the sponsor can use what is called an adaptive design trial.  Such a trial begins 
without firm or completely reliable estimates of the parameters above.  Instead, the trial employs 
real time data gathered from early-enrolling patients to refine estimates of the parameters and 
adjust sample size or treatment allocation based on the new estimates.   
There are two types of adaptive designs that use interim data to modify sample size while 
the trial is in progress.  In one, called a sequential-group approach, the sponsor starts with a trial 
that is conservatively large – using parameters at the lower end of the range for clinically-
relevant effects and at the higher end of the range for variation in treatment effects – but stops 
the trial early if interim data suggest that treatment effects are larger than clinically relevant or 
have smaller variance than hypothesized.  The other design, called simply an adaptive approach, 
does the opposite.  It starts with a trial that is deliberately small and extends the trial if estimates 
of the treatment effect are smaller than the clinically relevant amount or estimates of the 
treatment effect variance are larger than hypothesized.  Either adaptive design requires a larger 
sample size than a fixed design.  Moreover, because the trial is updated after the sponsor “tests” 
the data by estimating treatment effects, the critical p-value may have to be reduced to account 
for multiple testing.  The exact multiple-testing penalty has been derived in statistical literature.
52
 
There are also adaptive designs intended to adjust the proportion of enrolled subjects 
assigned to the treatment group based on interim data analysis.  If, for example, outcomes in the 
treatment group show higher variance relative to the control group than anticipated, then the 
sponsor may change group assignments so that more than half of subjects get treatment.  So long 
as the estimate of the variance of treatment effects – the difference in outcomes in the treatment 
and control groups – does not increase, so that the sample size remains constant, the sponsor 
pays no multiple-testing penalty for such an adaptive design.
53
   
                                                 
51
 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
52
 Cyrus R. Mehta and Nitin R. Patel, Adaptive, Group Sequential and Decision Theoretic Approaches to Sample 
Size Determination, 25 Statistics in Medicine 3250-3269 (2006). 
53
 Even if the estimate of variance of treatment effects falls, the sponsor cannot stop the trial early.  But if the 
estimate of overall variance of treatment effects rises, then the sample size increases and the sponsor must pay a 
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The FDA is open to use of adaptive designs.  Its Critical Path initiative begun in 2004, 
seeks to identify biological and statistical innovations that can improve the efficiency of clinical 
trials and incorporate them into the drug development and approval process.  That initiative has 
identified adaptive designs as one area on which to focus its attention.  Indeed, the FDA is 
expected to release a guidance on adaptive designs to clarify its thinking.
54
 
ii. Adaptive design for subgroup analysis 
None of these adaptive designs, however, are specifically intended to address subgroup 
effects.  They are mainly directed at optimizing over power and cost for main group effects.  
That does not mean that that no one has thought of applying adaptive designs to estimate 
subgroup effects.  We know of no instances, however, where the FDA has approved an adaptive 
design to facilitate subgroup analysis, though the FDA has considered or allowed a number of 
trials with adaptive designs.   
How might an adaptive design be used for subgroup analysis?  Consider a two-arm trial 
(treatment and control)
55
 with sample size set to test just one hypothesis: the average treatment 
effect for one all enrolled patients is zero.  At some interim point, the sponsor or the independent 
data monitoring committee (IDMC) examines the data to determine if there is a subgroup of 
patients on which the trial should focus because they may be particularly responsive to treatment.  
There are two types of data that might be used to identify subgroups: baseline characteristics 
measured before the start of a trial alone or treatment outcomes measured during the course of 
the trial.  In the first case, the sponsor looks for abnormal variation in a relevant covariate.  For 
example, if there is much more variation than expected in treatment history or in the pre-trial 
progression of symptoms, the full trial population can be divided into subgroups using a cut-off 
based on the extent of prior treatment or symptoms.  In the second case, the IDMC may look at 
the relationship between certain covariates and treatment effects.  (The IDMC is used rather than 
the sponsor to ensure that the sponsor does not become unblinded.)  If the data suggests, for 
example, that certain age or ethnic subpopulations are responding better to treatment, those 
groups can become target subgroups for the study. 
After this interim analysis, the sponsor would have to revisit the objective of the trial.  
There are two choices.  First, the sponsor could examine just one hypothesis but limit it to a 
subgroup identified by interim analysis as particularly sensitive to treatment.  Specifically, the 
null hypothesis would become: the treatment effect for one subgroup is zero.  We assume in this 
case that, after the interim analysis, the sponsor would discontinue enrollment of subjects that do 
                                                                                                                                                             
multiple-testing penalty.  The reason is that it was given a “real option” of testing and must pay a price for this 
option. 
54
 See Gottlieb, supra note 48. 
55
 This is also called a parallel-armed trial. 
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not belong to this subgroup, lest they waste sample size.  The sponsor’s other choice is to 
examine two or more hypotheses based on the number of subgroups discovered through interim 
analysis.  For example, if that analysis identified two subgroups based on ethnicity, the trial 
might test two hypotheses: the treatment effect for whites is zero and the treatment effect for 
non-whites is zero.   
As with adaptive designs targeting sample size adjustments, adaptive designs targeting 
subgroups will require a larger sample size and appropriate adjustments of the statistical 
methodology.  These can be derived, though we do not do so here.  In particular, the design may 
require that that the sponsor pay a penalty, i.e., that the results be held to a more stringent or 
lower critical p-value before they are declared statistically significant, to account for the 
possibility of multiple testing.  We explore these penalties in the Appendix.   
Before we conclude our discussion of adaptive designs, it is worth noting an important 
weakness of these designs.  Because of ethical and profit considerations, they may not be optimal 
for identifying side effects of treatments.  If interim analysis suggests a particular subgroup may 
have worse side effects, both the sponsor and patient advocates will push to exclude that 
subgroup from further analysis.  But doing so limits the amount of data we have on that subgroup 
and thus on the side effects of the drug.   
c. Proposal for independent post hoc subgroup analysis 
In this subsection we consider how it might be possible – working with a fixed, non-
adaptive design trial – to use post hoc subgroup analysis to approve a drug without further trials.  
Post hoc subgroup analysis does not increase the risk of false positive drug approvals so long as 
the FDA makes appropriate multiple-testing corrections.  But appropriate multiple-testing 
corrections require knowledge of the number of tests the sponsor has performed.  Because of the 
financial incentive to have its drug approved, the sponsor cannot be relied upon to truthfully 
report the number of tests it has performed.
56
  Indeed, the FDA can be confident that the sponsor 
probably conducted more tests than that for which the FDA plans to adjust.  Therefore, there 
remains a residual risk of false positive above 5%.   
i. Choosing an independent agent 
                                                 
56
 We have considered the possibility that the FDA could specify prior to a phase III trial the exact subgroups the 
sponsor may examine.  This could be based on the subject-matter of the trial or on the FDA’s knowledge of data 
from trials of competing drugs by other sponsors.  There are two problems with this reform.  First, the sponsor could 
specify subgroups based on subject matter as well as the FDA and has a strong financial interest in doing so.  We 
doubt there are valuable subgroups that the FDA could propose that the sponsor will not have already considered.  
Second, sponsors of the competing drugs are likely to object to the FDA’s use of their trial data – which is treated as 
a trade secret, see Article 39.3 of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement – in this manner.  They 
would have a reasonable argument that this competitively favors later new drug applicants over earlier ones.  It 
would also subtly reduce the incentive to innovate quickly. 
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 A critical assumption in this logic is that the sponsor is financially interested in having 
the drug approved.  If post hoc subgroup analysis were performed by a truly independent auditor, 
then the FDA could rely upon that agent’s report of the number of tests it conducted and fully 
eliminate the risk of false positives by means of multiple-testing adjustments.  Of course the real 
question is whether the auditor is truly independent, a topic to which we will turn in a moment.   
There are two basic candidates for an independent auditor: the FDA and an outside 
statistical consulting firm.  Each has its strengths and weaknesses.  The strength of using the 
FDA is that by doing the post hoc subgroup analysis itself, the FDA knows immediately the 
number of tests conducted.  There is no need to rely on the absence of any other motive, as will 
be the case with an outside consulting firm.  There are two weaknesses of the FDA.  It has 
limited resources that make it difficult to maintain even the current level of scrutiny of new drug 
applications (NDAs).
57
  Moreover, the FDA is subject to political pressure. It has been criticized 
for being influenced both by drug companies and by political backlash following approval of 
unsafe drugs.
58
  These pressures are unlikely to perfectly offset to create an unbiased 
decisionmaker.  As a result, the FDA may conduct too much subgroup analysis – at the cost of 
false positives – or too little subgroup analysis – at the cost of false negatives or more costly 
approval.   
The alternative is an outside statistical consulting firm.  Many already exist to help 
sponsors design and analyze data from trials.
59
  The strength of consulting firms is, perhaps, 
more statistical expertise than the FDA.  Unlike the FDA, which has limited resources and no 
need to compete, these firms have every reason to specialize and innovate because it may make it 
more likely they are selected to perform subgroup analysis.   
The main weakness of the consulting firm approach is that these firms may not be truly 
independent.  Sponsors are repeat players.  A consulting firm may have an incentive to give a 
favorable analysis so as to secure repeat business from sponsors.  That repeat business may be 
for subgroup analysis or some other statistical service.  This is a lesson well learned from the 
corporate accounting scandals from earlier this decade.
60
  Perhaps the indirect influence of 
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 See, e.g., Institute of Medicine, The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public 
193 (2007).  Drawing inspiration from PDUFA, one possible solution is to charge companies that seek drug 
approval for a patient subgroup to pay higher user fees to fund subgroup analysis conducted by the FDA.   
58
 See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. is Faulted for Drug-Safety Process, New York Times (Sept. 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/business/22fdacnd.html?ex=1316577600&en=04c9d9824b892f3b&ei=5088&
partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (last visited Jan. 30, 2009); Avery Johnson and Ron Winslow, Drug Makers Say FDA 
Safety Focus Is Slowing New-Medicine Pipeline, Wall Street Journal (June 30, 2008), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121476772560213981. html?mod=hps_us_whats_news (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
59
 See, e.g., Cytel Statistical Software and Services, founded by Cyrus R. Mehta and Nitin R. Patel, and Target 
Analytics, Inc., run by Mark van der Laan. 
60
 See Demski, supra note 12, at 57. 
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sponsors can be addressed by requiring the FDA to select the outside consultant to perform post 
hoc analysis, by blinding the sponsor to the outside firm selected, and by banning firms that 
perform post hoc analysis from providing other statistical services to sponsors.  We wonder, 
however, whether the agency will always be able to keep the identity of the consulting firm 
secret, even after the analysis is completed and the FDA has made its regulatory decision 
concerning a sponsor’s drug.  Moreover, restricting the consulting firms’ scope of business will 
limit their ability to attract talent and incentive to innovate in the area of subgroup analysis since 
it comes at the cost of other lines of business.   
A second weakness of using consulting firms is that “independence of the sponsor” is not 
the same thing as “motivated to reduce false positives.”  True independence only guarantees the 
consulting firm will not be swayed by the profit interests of the sponsor.  It does not guarantee 
that the consulting firm extracts the most and reliable data from post hoc analysis after it is 
chosen to perform that analysis.  This problem is one which economists call moral hazard.  
Independence merely substitutes the sponsor’s interests with those of the consulting firm.  Most 
likely this is cost minimization, which may imply too many false negatives or false positives, 
whichever minimize the consulting firm’s labor expense.61   
ii. Statistical methods to guarantee independence 
To address the problem that neither the FDA nor the outside consultant may be truly 
independent of the sponsor, we propose two statistical methods to limit either agent’s ability to 
skew the analysis in favor of the sponsor.
62
  For convenience, we shall speak as if the consulting 
firm has been chosen to conduct the analysis. 
No-outcome data analysis.  The first approach would provide the consultant with all the 
data from the trial except variables that identify treatment assignments and health outcomes and 
                                                 
61
 The outside consulting firm must also be concerned about not doing too many tests.  Each useless test it performs 
increases the multiple-testing adjustment for any positive finding.  Minimizing false negatives requires internalizing 
this negative externality.  Since false negatives are unobservable, the FDA cannot directly incentivize the consulting 
firm to do so.  And the FDA certainly should not give the firm an incentive keyed to drug approval, because then it 
would have incentives like the sponsor and replace false negatives with false positives. 
62
 These methods do not address other problems, such as the limited resources of the FDA or the insufficient 
motivation of outside consulting firms.  If the statistical methods we discuss help ensure that the consultant truly 
cannot manipulate the data to increase false positives, then one might address the problem of a consultant’s 
motivation by giving it stock in the sponsor.  (This is identical to extracting the outcome or a random subsample of 
data from the data archives of the drug sponsor.  We consider granting the consultant stock instead because it is 
virtually impossible to separate the sponsor from knowledge of its data.)  We do not advocate this because it is too 
radical and would be politically infeasible.  That said, giving the consultant some sponsor stock is not the same as 
allowing the sponsor to conduct the entire post hoc subgroup analysis because the statistical methods we propose in 
the main text require that the consultant not have access to certain data that the sponsor already has, or could easily 
obtain.   
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ask it to identify subgroups based on baseline characteristics that exhibit “remarkable and 
relevant variation” in the trial data.63  (This is similar to one of the approaches used to identify 
subgroups for the adaptive design trials discussed in the last subsection.)  The consultant would 
not be asked to perform the post hoc subgroup analysis; that could be conducted by the sponsor, 
though the FDA would rely upon positive treatment effects only for the subgroups identified by 
the consultant.  Whatever positive subgroup results the sponsor reports, the FDA would apply a 
multiple-testing adjustment based on all the subgroups reported by the outside consultant.   
In order to identify remarkable variation, the consultant needs to have a sense of what 
normal variation would be.  It could estimate normal variation in baseline characteristics from 
trials of the sponsor’s drug or prior studies in the literature.  The consultant would have to be 
sensitive to exclusion and inclusion criteria, which can affect the applicability of prior data to the 
current trial sample.  Moreover, the consultant would have to keep in mind that any subgroup it 
identifies should be defined by variables that are plausibly relevant (from our current biological 
understanding of the disease targeted by the sponsor’s drug and the pharmacology of that drug) 
to the treatment effects of the drug. 
Split-sample analysis.  The second statistical method we propose to ensure that the 
consultant’s choice of subgroups is not influenced by the rug company requires splitting the data 
from a trial into two parts.  One part would be called the exploratory subsample and the other 
part the confirmatory subsample.  Importantly, the FDA must split the sample to ensure the drug 
company has no influence and the sample should be split randomly to ensure the samples are 
statistically independent.  The consultant would only be given the exploratory subsample and be 
asked to conduct a full post hoc subgroup analysis on that subsample to identify subgroups that 
respond better to the drug.
64
  The sponsor would then be allowed to perform post hoc subgroup 
analysis on the confirmatory sample using only the subgroups identified from the exploratory 
subsample by the consultant.  As before, the FDA would apply a multiple-testing penalty based 
on all the subgroups reported by the outside consultant.   If, after such penalty, the confirmatory 
subsample validates the positive subgroup effects from the exploratory subsample, the FDA 
could approve the drug only for those subgroups. 
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 While we focus on identifying subgroups by examining baseline characteristics with remarkable variation, it is 
equally valid to ask the consultant to identify subgroups by examining baseline characteristics which have a 
distribution which is remarkable in any significant way.  This instruction would allow subgroups to be identified by 
characteristics with, for example, surprising high or low means or skew.  The statistical method we present in the 
main text focuses on the second moment of the baseline characteristic only for purposes of illustration. 
64
 The sponsor could not be asked to do this because it would likely be able to derive the confirmatory subsample 
from the exploratory subsample and the full sample, which it already possesses.  This would allow it to choose 
subgroups ostensibly on the exploratory subsample but truly on the full sample.  The result would be almost the 
same as post hoc subgroup analysis by the sponsor. 
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Both statistical methods ensure that subgroups are identified independent of the interests 
of the sponsor.  Since the first method does not give the consultant access to outcome data, it 
cannot choose subgroups to help or hinder the sponsor.  Since the second method requires the 
sponsor to limit its subgroup analysis to a subsample that is statistically independent of the 
subsample analyzed by the consultant, the consultant’s analysis cannot help the sponsor engage 
in data mining.  Moreover, neither method requires that the FDA  impose any additional 
multiple-testing penalty beyond one based on the total number of subgroups identified by the 
consultant.   
Each statistical method also has its shortcomings.  The weakness of the no-outcome data 
approach is that the subgroups with the most remarkable variation may not be perfectly 
correlated with the subgroups that have positive and significant treatment effects.  Abnormal 
variation is just one factor that suggests differential treatment effects; it does not guarantee them.  
The main concern with split-sample approach is that the post hoc subgroup analysis, which 
would be underpowered even if performed on the whole trial sample, is particularly 
underpowered if performed on subsamples.  This will increase the risk of false negatives.  This 
risk may be considered the cost of independence under this method.  In short, the two statistical 
algorithms reduce, but do not eliminate false negatives.   
4. An illustration with motexafin gadolinium 
In this section we illustrate our two statistical algorithms for ensuring independent post 
hoc subgroup analysis by applying them to a real world example: motexafin gandolium (MGd) 
for patients with brain metastases from solid lung tumor.  MGd is sponsored by Pharmacyclics 
(ticker PYCY), a small biotech company that branded the drug as Xcytrin.  We first provide 
some background on clinical testing of the drug and then discuss post hoc subgroup analysis of 
the testing results. 
a. Background on MGd 
Tumorous cancers in one part of the body often spread – or metastasize – to other parts of 
the body.  In up to 24% of all cancer patients, they spread to the brain.
65
  The risk is especially 
severe with lung cancer, where up to 50% of patients experience brain metastasis
66
 and 
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 J.B. Posner, Neurological complications of cancer (1995).   
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 M. Stuschke, W. Eberhardt, C. Pottgen, et al., Prophylactic cranial irradiation in locally advanced non-small-cell 
lung cancer after multimodality treatment: Long-term follow-up and investigations of late neuropsychological 
effects, 17 J. Clin. Oncol. 2700-2709 (1999); T.J. Robnett, M. Machtay, J.P. Stevenson, et al., Factor affecting the 
risk of brain metastases after definitive chemoradiation for locally advanced non-small-cell lung carcinoma, 19 J. 
Clin. Oncol. 1344-1349 (2001). 
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metastasis occurs earlier than with other cancers.
67
  Most patients with brain metastases die.  
Median survival on whole brain radiation therapy, the typical conventional treatment, is only 4 




MGd is a drug that demonstrated the ability to increase the radiation response of tumor 
cells in preclinical studies.  Pharmacyclics sought to market the drug as a treatment for brain 
metastases.  The company filed an investigational new drug (IND) application with the FDA to 
begin clinical testing of the drug in human patients.  After a successful Phase I/II study,
69
 the 
company began a Phase III study (called trial 9801) that enrolled patients with any type of 
cancerous tumor who developed brain metastases.  Subjects were randomized to either whole 
brain radiation therapy (WBRT) alone (the control arm) or MGd and WBRT (treatment arm).  
Unfortunately, this study did not find a statistically significant treatment effect with respect to 
median survival or time to neurological impairment.
70
     
One bright spot in trial 9801, however, was that patients with specifically lung cancer did 
experience statistically significant extension of time to neurological impairment.
71
  So 
Pharmacyclics conducted a second Phase III trial (called Trial 0211) targeting only lung cancer 
patients.  Unfortunately, this second trial was unable to validate the results from the initial trial.  
This is illustrated in Table 2, which summarizes the results from trial 0211 and from lung cancer 
patients in trial 9801.  According to the first panel, whereas the relative hazard rate for 
neurological impairment
72
 was 0.61 (p = 0.05) in the initial trial, it was merely 0.78 and not 
significantly different from 1 (p = 0.1) in the second trial.   
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 The sing-armed study found a 72% radiologic response rate.  P. Carde, R. Timmerman, M.P. Mehta, et al., 
Multicenter phase Ib/II trial of the radiation enhancer motexafin gadolinium in patients with brain metastases, 19 J. 
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 Median survival was 5.2 mo. on treatment versus 4.9 mo. on control (p = 0.48).  Median time to impairment of 
neurological function was 9.5 mo. on treatment versus 8.3 mo. on control (p = 0.95).  Mehta et al., supra note 68, at 
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median patient on WBRT alone experienced impairment at 7.4 mo (p = 0.048).  Mehta et al., supra note 68, at 2533 
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blinded graders.  Patients were said to be impaired if the composite score was at least 1.5 standard deviations worse 
than the mean of the test’s age-adjusted distribution. Christina A. Meyers, et al., Neurocognitive Function and 
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Trying to explain the discrepancy between the trials and to salvage MGd for a new drug 
application (NDA), Pharmacyclics conducted a post hoc subgroup analysis.  According to the 
company, this analysis revealed a problem at some of the study centers in France.  Although the 
trial protocol required that subjects be randomized to treatment as soon as they were diagnosed 
with brain metastases, the French centers waited several weeks or more after diagnosis before 
randomizing subjects to treatment.
73
  In the interim, the centers gave subjects chemotherapy
74
 
(hence these subjects are labeled “controlled” patients in the data).  Moreover, subjects were 
ultimately randomized in trial 0211 only if their brain tumors progressed despite chemotherapy, 
i.e., their tumors were resistant to treatment.
75
  So this was a self-selected group of tumors.  
Whereas “uncontrolled” subjects randomized immediately had a mix of resistant and non-
resistant brain tumors, the controlled subjects ultimately randomized in the problematic French 




Not surprisingly, these subjects also did not show benefit from MGd.  Excluding these 
late-randomizing centers from the analysis revealed that drug had a statistically significant effect 
on delay until onset of neurological impairment.  As reported in the second of panel of Table 2, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Progression in Patients With Brain Metastases Treated With Whole-Brain Radiation and Motexafin Gadolinium: 
Results of a Randomized Phase III Trial, 22 J. Clin. Oncology 157, 158 (2004).  The hazard rate for impairment  is 
the rate at which patients are judged impaired, i.e., it is the fraction of additional patients judged impaired each 
month. The relative hazard rate is the ratio of the hazard rate in the treatment group to the rate in the control group.   
73
 Ordinarily, a drug sponsor is responsible for ensuring that its study centers follow trial protocols.  The company 
attributes the problem in this case to recruitment difficulties.  Whereas the trial 9801 had 401 total patients, of which 
only 251 had lung cancer, trial 0211 required 554 lung cancer patients to have the statistical power to validate the 
positive results for lung cancer patients from the initial trial.  This required the second trial to recruit patients from 
90 treatment centers throughout the world, more than double the 40 centers involved in the initial Phase III trial.  
The company argues that it is difficult to precisely enforce the protocol with so many centers involved in a study.  
Personal communication with Richard Miller, former CEO of Pharmacyclics, Mar. 14, 2008. 
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 Chemotherapy is not thought to be a reliable treatment for brain metastases because chemotherapy relies upon 
drug delivered by blood and the brain tumor is somewhat protected from chemotherapy drugs by the blood-brain 
barrier.   
75
 The implicit but reasonable assumption here is that a brain tumor resistant to chemotherapy is resistant to any 
other form of treatment.   
76
 The selection story is a bit more complicated.  The delay also screened out patients who had died from, inter alia, 
the brain metastases prior to randomization.  Since early death is an indicator of a more severe brain tumor, this 
mortality screen likely selected for less severe brain tumors.  It is probably the case that the selection on the basis of 
resistance to chemotherapy (which likely reduced the effect of MGd) was more significant than selection based on 
survival (which possibly increased the effect of MGd).  The reason is that median survival following diagnosis with 
brain metastases is 4 months, so it is unlikely that mortality was a material screen in the first two weeks following 
diagnosis.  Yet it is in these first two weeks that the company found a significant delay in neurological impairment 
among patients treated with MGd.   
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the relative hazard rate for uncontrolled subjects on MGd in the 0211 trial was 0.56 (p = 0.02).  
In other words, while MGd proved effective among subjects with uncontrolled brain tumor, this 
effect was masked by including subjects with controlled brain tumor in the main analysis.  
Pharmacyclics filed an NDA with the FDA relying on this subgroup analysis.  But the FDA did 
not credit the company’s explanation and finally rejected its NDA in December 2007.77   
Of course, this is the company’s explanation for its unsuccessful final Phase III trial and 
it had a financial stake in getting MGd approved for some subgroup.  Our aim is to scrutinize 
these claims by taking the role of an outside consultant and checking whether analysis of data in 
a manner that is independent of the financial interests of the sponsor identifies the same sensitive 
subgroups that the sponsor identified, namely the subjects with uncontrolled tumor.   
b. No-outcome data analysis 
Our first analysis examines the final Phase III study (trial 0211) data stripped of outcome 
variables.  The idea is that an independent statistical consultant without outcome data would not 
be able to select subgroups that would financially benefit the company because it does not know 
whether any subgroups had better or worse outcomes than average among the full trial 
population.  Instead, this consultant would identify subgroups by searching for baseline 
characteristics on which current trial subjects had excess variation relative subjects in previous 
trials or in the population.  These characteristics could then be used to define subgroups on 
which the drug company could perform post hoc subgroup analysis.  If and only if that subgroup 
analysis suggested the subgroup responded positively to the drug, the FDA should approve the 
drug for use in that subgroup.   
To implement this algorithm, we compare the variation of certain medical characteristics 
in the trial 0211 sample with variation of those variables in the initial Phase III study (trial 9801) 
sample.  The variables include features of the primary (lung) tumor, treatment of the primary 
tumor, features of the brain metastases, the treatment of the brain metastases before enrollment, 
and neurological impairment at baseline. Table 3 reports the ratio of variances of each variable 
across the two samples and the p-value for the hypothesis test that the variances are equal across 
the samples after adjusting for multiple testing.     
Eight subgroups stand out.  The 0211 trial had excess variation in the variables: days 
from diagnosis of brain metastases to randomization, extracranial metastases, baseline Trail B 
score, and whether the study center was in Canada.  The delay variable captures some of the 
company’s concern that patients in some French centers received chemotherapy for a few weeks 
before being randomized and that the brain masses that survived this chemotherapy were more 
resilient.  The trail B is a test of cognitive ability where the subject is asked to follow a “trail” on 
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a sheet of paper with his pencil.  A lower score is better: it indicates less time was required to 
follow the trail.  It also indicates that the brain metastasis probably has not advanced beyond the 
point where it can be treated.   
The 0211 trial also had insufficient variation in: primary tumor (PT) resected without 
recurrence, primary tumor is large cell carcinoma, primary tumor controlled, and study center is 
in the US.  The PT resected variable is one of five categories into which a primary tumor is 
categorized at the time a patient is randomized.
78
  The resected category indicates that the 
primary tumor was surgically and successfully treated and the patients only remaining concern is 
the brain metastases.  The PT controlled variable is the complement of the variable that the 
company identified as being responsible for the failure of the 0211 trial.   
Having identified eight subgroups with remarkable variation, we now check to see if 
MGd was particularly effective amongst these subgroups in the full 0211 data.  For binary 
variables, subgroups are defined by their two states.  For continuous variables subgroups in the 
0211 data are defined by whether a characteristic lies above or below the median for that 
characteristic in the 9801 data.  Table 4 summarizes our subgroup analyses with a multiple-
testing adjustment that accounts for 16 tests (eight variables with excess variation and two 
subgroups for each variable).  We find four subgroups have significant treatment effects, i.e., 
lower rate of neurological impairment: subjects with little delay before randomization, subjects 
at U.S. study centers, subjects with low (good) baseline Trail B scores, and subjects with 
uncontrolled brain metastases.   
Thus the no-outcome data analysis would support Pharmacyclics’ case for approval for 
subjects with uncontrolled brain tumors.  The other subgroups that survive no-outcome data 
analysis are consistent with the company’s theory that MGd works on less resistant tumors.  
Subjects randomized quickly and subjects in the U.S. are less likely to have received 
chemotherapy before randomization.  As for subjects with low trail B scores, these are subjects 
whose tumors are not so far along that they already seriously impede subjects’ cognitive 
capacity.  It makes sense the treatment is also likely to work in these cases. 
c. Split-sample analysis 
Our second (and preferred) proposal is to split the data from trial 0211 into two 
subsamples, have an outside consultant to identify subgroups via post hoc subgroup analysis on 
one (exploratory) sample, and then allow the drug sponsor to validate significant treatment 
effects for the other (confirmatory) sample.  Only if a subgroup identified by the outside 
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 The tumor may have been (1) “newly diagnosed,” which means the primary tumor and the brain metastasis was 
diagnosed at the same time, (2) surgically removed or resected without recurrence, (3) treated for less than 4 weeks 
without clear indication that it has progressed, (4) treated for greater than 4 weeks with no sign of progression, or (5) 
treated for any amount of time with evidence of progression. 
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consultant demonstrates statistically significant effects – after a multiple-testing penalty – in the 
confirmatory sample should the FDA approve the drug for that subgroup.  Because the outside 
consultant does not have access to the confirmatory sample and because the FDA would only 
credit evidence of treatment effects from the confirmatory subsample, the consultant cannot rig 
its analysis to help the drug sponsor.   
We begin our simulation of the split-sample analysis by randomly dividing the 0211 trial 
sample into a 20% exploratory sample and an 80% confirmatory sample.
79
  The second step is to 
conduct a subgroup analysis of the exploratory sample where subgroups are defined according to 
baseline variables.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.  The vertical panel 
labeled “Value A” gives the relative hazard of neurological impairment and the p-value for each 
variable at value 0 for binary variables and at the first quartile for continuous variables.  The 
vertical panel labeled “Value B” gives the relative hazard of neurological impairment and the p-
value for each variable at value 1 for binary variables and at the third quartile for continuous 
variables.
80
  None of the p-values have been adjusted for multiple testing.
81
  We choose a 
subgroup (now defined both by a given variable and a specific value for that variable) for the 
third step in our simulation if it has a p-value less than 0.05, i.e., if we can be 95% confident that 
the membership in the subgroup improves treatment effects.  The two subgroups we identify in 
this manner are (1) enrollment at center other than one in France and (2) not having previously 
received the chemotherapy drug carboplatin.  The relative hazard rate (into neurological 
impairment) for subjects outside France and on MGd is 0.32 (p = 0.05363) and for subjects not 
having received carboplatin and on MGD is 0.039 (p = 0.07833).   
The last step in the split sample analysis is to estimate the treatment effects for these 
subgroups in the confirmatory sample.  This analysis reveals that the relative hazard rate for 
MGd among subjects outside France is 0.676 (raw p = 0.038, adj. p = 0.076) and among subjects 
who had not previously been treated with carboplatin is 0.905 (raw p = 0.58, adj. p = 0.58).  
Even with the high correlation ( = 0.39) in membership across these subgroups, the effect of 
MGd outside France is not statistically significant after adjusting p-values for multiple tests (on 
two groups).  The effect of type of prior chemotherapy is not significant even without the 
multiple-testing adjustment. 
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 Our selection of a 20-80 split is arbitrary.  Further statistical analysis is required to determine the optimal split of 
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spurious correlation from multiple testing. 
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So it appears that our spit sample analysis – unlike the no-outcome data analysis – fails to 
support Pharmacyclics explanation for why the 0211 trial did not validate the 9801 trial.  To be 
precise, however, all we have shown is that the particular sample split we randomly drew chose 
did not validate Pharmacyclics claim.  Perhaps another random split would validate their claim.  
Indeed, a better way to characterize the value of the split-sample analysis for eliminating alleged 
false negatives is to ask, what fraction of splits would validate Pharmacyclics’ claim that MGd 
works in the subgroup of patients whose brain tumor was not controlled via chemotherapy?   
To conduct this analysis we drew 100 splits of the 0211 trial data and ranked the 
subgroups in the exploratory stage in order of statistical significance of relative hazard for 
neurological impairment, just as Table 5 did for our initial split.  The first row of Table 6 
provides the distribution of p-values that the “uncontrolled” subgroup takes across the hundred 
splits, with a smaller p-value indicating a larger significance of that difference.  We find that in 
35% of draws uncontrolled has a p-value of less than 0.05.  Thus in 35% of cases, the 
“uncontrolled” subgroup advances to the validation stage.  Further, in 31% (= 11/35) of these 
cases, the effect among the uncontrolled subgroup is validated in the confirmatory sample after a 
conservative Bonferroni multiple-testing adjustment that accounts for the number of subgroups 
that emerge from the exploratory analysis in each sample split.  See row 3 of Table 6.  In other 
words, in only 11 % of cases, the split-sample analysis confirms Pharmacyclics’ claim that MGd 
works so long as the patient’s brain tumor is not previously treated with chemotherapy.   
Because in the case of MGd we have not one but two Phase III trials, there is one other 
test we can do – in the spirit of split sample analysis – to verify Pharmacyclics’ claim about 
uncontrolled patients.  We can check whether the subgroup effects identified by the company, by 
the no-outcome data analysis, and by 11 % of the split-sample analyses above can be validated 
by in the subsample of lung cancer patients in the 9801 trial.
82
  As can be seen in Table 2, the 
uncontrolled subgroup is indeed associated with statistically significant treatment effect (RH = 
0.48, p = 0.03).  
Conclusion 
Roughly one in five drugs that enter clinical testing fails to prove that it is effective and 
safe.  Even in phase III, the failure rate is 36%.
83
  Sometimes failure is just that: the drug has no 
value.  But other times a drug is right for some patients and wrong for others.  Denying approval 
for a drug that benefits some patients, but not the average patient, increases the costs of drug 
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development but not the benefits.  Ideally, one would like to salvage such a drug by allowing its 
use for the non-average patient who would benefit.   
The challenge is bad behavior or moral hazard by drug sponsors.  With post hoc subgroup 
analysis (or data dredging in less polite language), sponsors will nearly always be able to find a 
subgroup of patients who appear to benefit from a drug.  Currently, the FDA addresses this risk 
of spurious correlation by requiring sponsors to validate their findings with additional clinical 
trials.  But this may cost tens of millions of dollars, and in turn increase the price of drugs.   
This paper offers a combination of institutional designs and statistical methods that can 
limit the risk of spurious findings – or false positives – from post hoc subgroup analysis without 
requiring additional, whole trials.  Our proposal for adaptive trials allows the use of subgroups to 
revise the hypothesis tests in a trial with little additional sample size.  Our proposal for 
independent statistical analysis, when combined with subgroup analysis without outcome data or 
subgroup analysis validated on a split sample, can actually identify subgroups increasing the risk 
of false positives or requiring additional sample size.  In other words, our proposals offer an 
approach to reduce the rate of failure in clinical trials, without a higher risk of false positives or 
with minimal additional clinical testing costs.   
While our proposals may be helpful, we recognize they are not panaceas.  It is possible 
that a drug which fails the average patient standard used by the FDA may not in fact be helpful 
to any subgroup of patients.  Our methods for identifying false negatives – drugs that have value 
for a subgroup of patients but not the average patient – may not identify every false negative.  
Finally, even if a drug is approved for the right subgroup, doctors may use it for the wrong 
subgroups or use it off label.  These are forms of false positives that we cannot address.  Indeed, 
by increasing the number of drugs available to doctors, we increase the risk of post-approval 
false positives.   
The reason we believe our proposals are worth pursuing, however, is that the alternatives 
– using an average-patient standard or requiring additional trials – are worse.  As we explained in 
Section 1, the average-patient standard implicitly assumes that doctor always give the drug to the 
wrong subgroup.  While doctors may not be perfect at sorting patients to drugs, we do not 
believe they are as bad as the FDA’s standard assumes.  Moreover, trials – especially Phase III 
trials – are very expensive.84  Trials focusing on subgroups are even more costly.  Because fewer 
patients are members of the subgroup than the full trial population, a trial focusing on a subgroup 
will take longer complete recruitment.  This, in turn, increases the opportunity costs of the trial.  
It is natural to wonder whether our proposal to eliminate false negatives in drug approval 
can also help eliminate false positives.  That is, should our proposals be used to identify drugs 
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DiMasi, supra note 32, at 162. 
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that have a no effect or a side effect for a patient subgroup, even though they are effective and 
safe for the average patient and thus FDA-approvable?  The answer is complicated.  As we have 
mentioned, adaptive trials are not helpful for identifying side effects.
85
  With respect to our other 
proposals, the answer depends on whether there is reason to believe that the FDA has a skewed 
incentive to disapprove helpful drugs.   
The central problem that motivates our proposals is moral hazard by drug sponsors.  
Sponsors have a financial incentive to find subgroups that show benefits from a drug whether or 
not the subgroups actually benefit from the drug.
86
  Likewise our proposal are only useful as 
against the FDA if it too suffers from moral hazard – though different in kind.  If the FDA has an 
incentive to disapprove a drug for certain patients even short of statistically significant evidence 
that it harms them, perhaps because the agency is concerned about press criticism,
87
 then there is 
also a reason to fear the FDA will overuse post hoc subgroup analysis to identify subgroups that 
do not benefit from a drug.   
If the FDA does not suffer such moral hazard, however, it should be allowed to conduct 
the post hoc analysis to eliminate false positives.  Since the FDA is conducting the analysis, it 
knows the number of subgroups it has tested and thus can apply a multiple-testing penalty to its 
own analysis.  The only reform that we can unambiguously recommend to address false 
negatives is that the FDA be sure to apply multiple testing penalties when it conducts or requires 
that drug sponsors check side effects in certain subgroups.
88
  Just as data dredging allows a drug 
company nearly always to find some subgroup of patients who appear to benefit from a drug, the 
more subgroups the FDA tests for side effects, the more likely the agency will find side effects 
when they do not actually exist.  
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 Adaptive trials use data from early enrollees to identify subgroups and then modify the trial to enroll more patients 
from those subgroups so as to explore drug effects in those subgroups.  When identifying subgroups with side 
effects, this will require enrolling more people who one suspects will experience side effects.  This is unethical and 
unlikely to be approved by an Institutional Review Board.  See the last paragraph of Section 3.b.ii. 
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 Obviously sponsors should not be assigned the task of conducting post hoc subgroup analysis to identify 
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 A subtle point related to this reform is that the FDA ought not blindly to apply multiple testing penalties to 
subgroups that a drug sponsor voluntarily offers up as experiencing side effects.  The reason is that the sponsor has 
an incentive to report that it tested far more subgroups than it actually did so as to raise the multiple testing penalty 
for the subgroup that it does identify as having a side effect.  In a backhanded way, this allow the drug sponsor to 
look responsible – it offered up a subgroup that should not get its drug – but  not actually lose any sales – the 
multiple testing penalty would render the result for that subgroup insignificant.  A better solution is for the FDA by 
itself to conduct post hoc subgroup analysis designed to identify subgroups who do not benefit from a drug. 
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Finally, we are aware that our paper raises a number of statistical questions, the answers 
to which would help the FDA refine regulations that allow certain post hoc subgroup analyses to 
inform approval decisions.  For example:  What is the proper multiple testing penalty for 
adaptive design trials?  Can sponsors use moments other than the variance, such as the mean or 
skew, to identify subgroups in the no-outcome data analyses?  What are the appropriate 
proportions (20-80 or something different) to use when dividing a sample into an exploratory and 
a confirmatory subsample?  Should the multiple-testing penalty applied to tests on the 
confirmatory subsample account for the fact that that subsample is smaller than the full sample?  
Under what conditions will the no-outcome data analysis eliminate more false negatives than the 




The table below summarizes the four basic options in a subgroup-identifying adaptive 
design and our speculation as to the appropriate multiple-testing penalty.  The rows indicate 
whether interim analysis employed outcome data or not.  The columns indicate whether the 
sponsor added hypothesis tests after the interim analysis.   
Table 1.  Multiple testing penalties in adaptive trials. 
Data used to identify 
subgroups 
Number of additional hypothesis tests added to study 
Zero One or more 
Covariates (not outcomes) No penalty Penalty for adding one or more hypothesis 
Outcomes Must keep other subgroups in 
evaluated population, plus a 
penalty for using outcome data 
Penalty for adding second hypothesis, must 
keep other subgroups in evaluated population, 
plus pay a penalty for using outcome data 
 
If outcome data are not used to identify subgroups and no additional hypothesis tests are 
added to the study, then there is no need to impose a multiple testing penalty, so long as the trial 
must proceed until the sample size specified prior to starting the trial is achieved.  The reason is 
there was no testing of treatment effects in the interim analysis and the number of tests remain 
the same as when the trial began.  Even though the sponsor may choose a subgroup with low 
variance with respect to covariate characteristics, so long as the data employed in the interim 
analysis (patients’ baseline characteristics) are unrelated to the data relevant for estimation of the 
treatment effect (patients’ treatment assignment and health outcomes), there is in essence 
additional testing of treatment effects in the interim analysis. The general idea is, so long as one 
analyzes a subset of the final data set that contains no information about treatment effects and 
does not increase the number hypotheses to be tested, there is no multiple testing penalty for 
changing the nature of the hypothesis to be tested with the final data. 
If outcome data were used to identify subgroups, there should be a multiple testing 
penalty even if no additional hypothesis tests were added.  The reason is that the sponsor was 
able to test whether treatment effects are significantly positive for a subgroup during the interim 
analysis.  Even with that subset of the final sample, it is highly likely that data mining would 
uncover at least one subgroup with significant treatment effects in the subsample.  As a result, 
the sponsor would have been given the option to change the hypothesis test’s scope based on 
treatment effects.  It must pay a price for that.   
This price is difficult to calculate since we may not know how many tests were 
performed to identify a subgroup.  It helps if that the IDMC conducts the interim analysis 
because it has less incentive to engage in data mining and in any case is more likely truthfully to 
report the number of tests performed.  But if the sponsor has a role on that committee or the 
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IDMC is not otherwise truly independent, institutional design may not help with calculating the 
multiple-testing adjustment.
89
   
In the cases where the sponsor adds one or more hypothesis to the study, it must pay an 
additional price for multiple testing on top of the price it pays based on the data employed to 
conduct the interim analysis.  The reason for this penalty is obvious – the number of hypothesis 
test has increased – and the size of the incremental penalty is straightforward to calculate.   
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 In that case, we speculate – though have not confirmed – that requiring the sponsor to include the excluded groups 
along with the newly targeted subgroup in the final analysis may address the problem that the FDA may not know 
the number of tests performed in the interim analysis. Suppose, for example, that interim analysis after 10% of the 
sample is enrolled reveals that only young patients have a significant treatment effect.  We recommend, when the 
sponsor tests the hypothesis that the treatment effect among young patients in its final empirical analysis, that the 
sponsor be required to use the entire sample and not just young subjects.  Specifically, the sample tested should 
include the elderly patients from the initial 10% sample even though they are not nominally the subject of the 
hypothesis test.  Our crude logic is that the larger the number of tests performed, the worse the relative performance 
of subgroups excluded from the modified hypothesis test, and the larger is the cost or penalty to the sponsor of 
having to include the excluded subgroups in the final empirical analysis.  Including the elderly from the 10% sample 
automatically make it less likely that the sponsor will be able to show that the drug works among young patients. 
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Tables and figures 
 





Group n RH raw p-value 
 
n RH raw p-value 
All 554 0.78 0.1 
 
251 0.61 0.05 
PT controlled? 
       
 
Yes 140 1.71 0.059 
 
93 0.94 0.86 
 
No 414 0.56 0.002 
 
158 0.48 0.03 
Newly diagnosed? 
      
 
Yes 259 0.59 0.032 
 
109 0.47 0.046 
 
No 295 0.92 0.69 
 
142 0.74 0.37 
Time from BM to Tx 
      
 
Tx ≤ 2 wks 274 0.6 0.022 
 
119 0.78 0.5 
 
2 < Tx ≤ 4 wks 161 0.78 0.41 
 
69 0.63 0.29 
 
Tx > 4 wks 119 1.23 0.5 
 
63 0.33 0.09 
Prior chemotherapy 
       
 
No 315 0.67 0.06 
 
155 0.57 0.07 
 
Yes 239 0.91 0.66 
 
96 0.72 0.42 
Trail B score 
       
 
Low 258 0.53 0.012 
 
121 0.76 0.44 
 
High 254 1.02 0.92 
 
96 0.7 0.41 
Country 
       
 
USA 185 0.39 0.0048 
 
123 0.76 0.45 
 
Netherlands 11 5.6 0.14 
 
54 0.38 0.074 
 
Canada 163 0.72 0.26 
 
46 0.4 0.14 
 
UK 0 
   
21 1.11 0.89 
 
France 117 1.49 0.21 
 
7 0.82 0.89 
 




Notes.  RH = relative hazard for MGd plus whole brain radiation therapy (WBRT) versus 
WBRT.  Raw p-value does not adjust for multiple testing.  Trial 9801 was original Phase III 
trial.  Trial 0211 was second Phase III trial.  PT = primary tumor.  BM = brain metastases.  Tx 





Table 3.  Identification of subgroups in non-outcome analysis: ratio of variance for baseline characteristics in 0211 
trial versus 9801 trial. 
Covariate Ratio p-value 
Extracranial metastases? 1.73 0.0006 
USA? 0.89 0.0006 
PT controlled? 0.81 0.0025 
Canada? 1.39 0.0068 
PT resected without recurrence? 0.50 0.0137 
Baseline Trail B score 1.63 0.0158 
PT is large cell carcinoma? 0.60 0.0267 
Days from diagnosis to randomization 5.29 0.0267 
PT treated, <=1 month follow-up? 1.72 0.0554 
PT is non-small-cell carcinoma? 0.80 0.1200 
RPA status 0.71 0.1519 
Baseline weight 1.27 0.2171 
Sex 0.98 0.2171 
PT has squamous histology? 0.78 0.2249 
PT treated, >1 month follow-up? 0.85 0.2249 
PT treated and progressing? 1.24 0.2734 
PT has other histology? 1.90 0.3143 
Prior chemotherapy? 1.04 0.4045 
Baseline delay score 0.90 0.4045 
Baseline COWA score 0.88 0.4045 
Baseline Trail A score 0.59 0.4045 
Baseline height 1.11 0.4075 
Multiple BM lesions? 0.89 0.4154 
PT newly diagnosed and/or untreated? 1.01 0.5843 
Age 65+? 0.96 0.6924 
Karnofsky Performance Score >= 90? 1.01 0.7010 
PT is adenocarcinoma? 0.99 0.8469 
Caucasian? 1.07 0.8469 
Baseline recall score 0.97 0.8469 
Baseline recognition score 0.98 0.9619 
Other race? 1.00 0.9931 
Notes.  P-value adjusts for multiple testing.  PT = primary tumor (i.e., 




Table 4.  Treatment effect in 0211 trial for subgroups identified by no-outcome data analysis. 
 Relative hazard p-value 
Canada? No 0.82 0.3782 
Canada? Yes 0.72 0.3782 
Extracranial metastases? - Low 0.85 0.5467 
Extracranial metastases? - High 0.71 0.2800 
PT is large cell carcinoma? No 0.78 0.2800 
PT is large cell carcinoma? Yes 0.90 0.8853 
Days from diagnosis to randomization - Low 0.55 0.0325 
Days from diagnosis to randomization - High 1.14 0.6646 
USA? No 0.99 0.9500 
USA? Yes 0.39 0.0325 
Baseline Trail B score - Low 0.50 0.0480 
Baseline Trail B score - High 0.96 0.8853 
PT controlled? No 0.56 0.0320 
PT controlled? Yes 1.71 0.1573 
PT resected without recurrence? No 0.73 0.1536 
PT resected without recurrence? Yes 3.07 0.3378 
Notes.  Relative hazard is for subjects on MGD and WBRT versus subjects on 




Table 5.  Identification of subgroups in split sample analysis: treatment effects in exploratory sample of 0211 trial. 
  Raw Value A  Value B 
 Factor p-value Value n RH p-value  Value n RH p-value 
france 9.11 0.027 0.0 84 0.32 0.05363  1.0 24 2.94 0.17954 
pr.carbo 10.87 0.048 0.0 83 0.39 0.07833  1.0 25 4.26 0.18103 
ptstagen 0.21 0.059 3.0 -- 1.72 0.42139  5.0 -- 0.37 0.07388 
neurbl20 12.67 0.088 0.0 98 0.63 0.28314  1.0 10 7.99 0.14457 
ltmptbm 0.20 0.098 0.0 49 1.32 0.61953  1.0 59 0.27 0.09389 
sympbl12 4.67 0.100 0.0 -- 0.47 0.12400  2.0 -- 2.18 0.36172 
neurbl18 0.22 0.110 5.0 -- 0.63 0.29587  5.0 -- 0.63 0.29587 
basetrla 2.08 0.130 -0.3 -- 0.51 0.15601  2.7 -- 1.06 0.90295 
euroaus 3.86 0.130 0.0 64 0.34 0.11599  1.0 44 1.33 0.61980 
metachro 4.25 0.130 0.0 58 0.28 0.11374  1.0 50 1.19 0.73841 
prior 3.66 0.140 0.0 67 0.40 0.13240  1.0 41 1.48 0.53320 
neurbl21 2.44 0.150 0.0 -- 0.57 0.24937  1.0 -- 1.40 0.54303 
sympbl7 4.71 0.150 0.0 -- 0.57 0.19931  0.0 -- 0.57 0.19931 
prantflg 5.46 0.160 0.0 86 0.54 0.20250  1.0 22 2.97 0.33156 
bmlesn 5.17 0.170 0.0 25 0.20 0.14510  1.0 83 1.01 0.98116 
sympbl2 1.96 0.170 0.0 -- 0.47 0.16551  1.0 -- 0.92 0.84827 
f.prrad 0.26 0.180 0.0 84 1.02 0.95880  1.0 24 0.27 0.13672 
pr.csca 3.23 0.180 0.0 68 0.42 0.15428  1.0 40 1.37 0.61691 
karnofsk 1.80 0.190 80.0 -- 0.51 0.16114  90.0 -- 0.92 0.85675 
ltmptdx 0.28 0.190 0.0 51 1.09 0.86437  1.0 57 0.31 0.14175 
neversmk 4.81 0.210 0.0 101 0.58 0.23766  1.0 7 2.80 0.37554 
prantday 1.46 0.210 0.0 -- 0.55 0.21645  44.5 -- 0.80 0.62516 
pbm.all 4.57 0.220 0.0 100 0.59 0.24367  1.0 8 2.68 0.39687 
txgt1.4 3.57 0.220 0.0 90 0.58 0.23659  1.0 18 2.06 0.43119 
controll 3.46 0.230 0.0 86 0.57 0.22919  1.0 22 1.98 0.45638 
motorlbl 0.38 0.240 5.0 -- 0.71 0.45018  5.0 -- 0.71 0.45018 
Notes.  Value A is 0 for binary variables and the first quartile for continuous variables.  Value B is 1 for binary 
variables and the third quartile for continuous variables.  Values are specified in the columns labeled value.  
Sample size is given in columns labeled “n”.  RH = relative hazard for MGd plus whole brain radiation therapy 
(WBRT) versus WBRT.  P-value for Value A and Value B adjusts for multiple testing.  Factor gives the ratio of 
variance at Value A and Value B.  P-value for factor does not adjust for multiple testing.   
 
Table 6.  Distribution of p-values for "uncontrolled" subgroup treatment effects, by sample, in various sample splits. 












Exploratory sample 16 19 11 19 35 100 
Validation sample (raw p-values) 14 18 2 1 0 35 
Validation sample (adj p-values) 2 9 9 10 4 35 
Notes.  First row gives distribution of p-values for “uncontrolled” subgroup across 100 sample splits after 
adjusting for multiple testing.  Second and third rows gives distribution of p-values in the validation sample for the 
35 splits where uncontrolled group is selected in exploratory sample, i.e., adjusted p-value for uncontrolled 
subgroup in exploratory sample is less than 0.05.   P-values in second row do not adjust for multiple testing.  P-
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